A Colonial Railway Given a New Strategic Job
In Catumbela, near the Angolan port city of Lobito, trains loaded with thousands of tonnes of copper from the Democratic Republic of Congo roar past the home of 20-year-old Manuela Julia. She is not thinking about critical minerals or billion-dollar investment plans. She is thinking about her bus fare. “Before, I had to use a taxi, which is much more expensive. Now it is cheaper and easier to travel,” she says.
The railway that makes her journeys easier carries far larger ambitions. It is the spine of the Lobito Corridor, a US-backed effort to secure access to Africa’s critical minerals, promote regional economic cooperation and, Washington hopes, help bring peace to conflict-torn eastern DR Congo. The corridor links Congo’s mineral-rich south to Angola’s Atlantic coast through the Benguela Railway and the Port of Lobito, sending copper and cobalt west to Western markets rather than east to China, which is where most of the region’s minerals now go.
Built in 1902, Rebuilt for the Energy Transition
The line was built in 1902 under Portuguese colonial rule to move goods and minerals from Central Africa to the sea. It was badly disrupted during Angola’s civil war and fully reopened in 2015 after reconstruction. Its importance has grown with demand for copper and cobalt, both essential for electrical components and the shift to cleaner energy. DR Congo is the world’s largest producer of cobalt and, with neighboring Zambia, one of the biggest producers of copper.
“The timing matters,” says Wellington Muzengeza, a Johannesburg-based political risk analyst. “Electrification and the energy transition have increased the strategic importance of copper, cobalt and reliable mineral supply chains.” For the United States, the corridor is a way to diversify supply and reduce reliance on China, which dominates much of the world’s mineral processing. A US-DR Congo strategic partnership names the route from the Congolese town of Sakania to Lobito as a priority for mineral exports. The project has attracted more than $750 million, including financing backed by the US International Development Finance Corporation and the Development Bank of Southern Africa, to upgrade tracks, signaling, and trains.
Inside the Mineral Terminal
At Lobito’s mineral terminal, the new traffic is already visible. On a recent day, a train carrying about 12,000 tonnes of copper cathodes from DR Congo was unloaded into a warehouse before shipment, mostly to the United States. The freight is handled by Lobito Atlantic Railway (LAR), which holds a 30-year concession to run freight services on the corridor and manage the terminal. Its chief operating officer, Nicholas Gregoir, says freight volumes have more than doubled since the company took over in January 2024. LAR expects to move about 200,000 tonnes of copper through the corridor in 2026.
“The Lobito Corridor is the shortest route for both Zambia and the DRC” to the Atlantic, says Kátila Vanessa Monteiro da Silva Neto, executive director of the Lobito Port Authority. Zambia, Africa’s second-largest copper producer, plans its own 830-kilometer rail link from the Copperbelt to the corridor. The port handled about 1.8 million tonnes of cargo in 2025, of which around 158,000 tonnes were minerals, while its mineral terminal can handle up to 3.6 million tonnes a year. “The port already has the capacity,” Neto says. “What we need now is sufficient railway capacity and rolling stock.”
A Route to the Sea Is Not a Factory
Shorter routes to market do not automatically change an economy. “Joining a corridor is not the same as industrializing,” Muzengeza says. Angolan businessman Adérito Areias calls the line “a corridor of development” because it crosses some of Angola’s most productive farmland. “If there isn’t an artery carrying products from the interior to where there is demand, those products simply rot where they are produced,” he says.
The benefits so far are real but modest. The state-owned passenger operator Caminho de Ferro de Benguela carried a record 1.6 million passengers in 2025. LAR says it employs nearly 1,000 people directly, 98 percent of them Angolan. “This job allows me to support my family,” says Domingos Canhama, a forklift operator and father of four. Muzengeza argues that the bigger prize lies in local engineering, maintenance, warehousing and agro-processing businesses, which need “access to the railway, not just proximity to it”: feeder roads, electricity, storage and predictable services.
Minerals, M23 and the Promise of Peace
The harder question is whether formalizing the mineral trade can help end the fighting in eastern DR Congo, where the struggle over mineral wealth has fuelled decades of conflict and where the M23 rebel group has recently seized many mineral-rich areas. The Congolese government says Rwanda backs M23 to gain access to Congo’s minerals. Rwanda denies it, even though the evidence of its support is widely described as overwhelming. Agreements brokered by US President Donald Trump commit both countries to more transparent mineral supply chains, cross-border investment and shared infrastructure, with a wider plan to connect these initiatives to the Lobito route.
Kinshasa wants deeds rather than signatures. At a meeting in Paris this month, it urged Washington to turn the strategic partnership into tangible investment. “We want the partnership to support local mineral processing, electricity access for households and businesses, and peace in the east,” said DR Congo’s Economy Minister Daniel Mukoko Samba. Better railways alone will not resolve the political and security tensions behind the conflict.
Exporting Batteries, Not Just Ore
Most of the copper and cobalt that rolls into Lobito leaves Africa to be processed and manufactured elsewhere. Angola earns transit fees and logistics jobs, but much of the higher-value work happens abroad. Angola’s Foreign Affairs Minister Téte António puts it plainly: “When you export raw materials, you are also exporting jobs and knowledge. We should not export lithium but export batteries.” That is the test the corridor will face. A railway built in the colonial era to carry ore to the coast can either repeat that pattern with newer partners or become the backbone of processing plants, farms and factories owned and run along its route. Which it becomes depends less on Washington than on the choices Luanda, Kinshasa and Lusaka make about what must be refined at home before it is loaded onto a ship.

